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INTRODUCTION 
An object's size, position, and orientation in depth relative to the viewer can vary 
such that any three-dimensional object can project an almost infinite number of images 
onto the two-dimensional retina (Biederman, 1995). Therefore, it is almost impossible 
that any given pattern of retinal stimulation caused by light reflected from an object or 
face has been previously encountered. One of the greatest mysteries of cognitive science 
is how the brain can use these novel patterns of retinal stimulation to recognize objects 
and faces in only a fraction of a second. Recently, there has been tremendous progress 
towards elucidating the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie visual object and 
face recognition (Tarr & Bulthoff, 1998). One of the most surprising findings is that 
visual recognition does not appear to be mediated by one general purpose recognition 
system, but that there are two neurologically-distinct subsystems that use different 
methods of representing shape and that subserve different types of recognition tasks 
(Farah, 1995). 
The evidence initially seemed to suggest that one neural subsystem had evolved 
for the sole purpose of recognizing faces, and that the other subsystem mediated all other 
types of recognition tasks ( e.g., Hay & Young, 1982; Yin, 1970). The strongest evidence 
for this position came from brain-damaged patients, neuroimaging studies, and visual 
half-field studies, all of which suggested that the brain regions that subserve face 
recognition are different from the brain regions that subserve other visual recognition 
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tasks. For example, some brain-damaged patients, known as prosopagnos1cs, are 
impaired at recognizing faces but show intact non-face object recognition whereas other 
patients show the reverse pattern of performance with intact face recognition but 
impaired object recognition (see Farah, 1994 for a review). Likewise, neuroimaging 
studies showed that there are regions of the brain that respond very selectively to faces 
(e.g., Sergent, Ohta & MacDonald, 1992). Visual half-field studies also suggested that 
the brain regions that mediate face recognition are different from the brain regions that 
underlie basic-level object recognition. Visual half-field studies find much better 
recognition performance when faces are presented in the left visual field and thus initially 
to the right hemisphere of the brain than when faces are presented in the right visual field 
and thus to the left hemisphere of the brain (Davidoff, 1982, and Ellis, 1983, provide 
reviews). In contrast, no right hemisphere advantage is typically found during basic-level 
object recognition (Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Bryden & Rainey, 1963; Kimura & 
Durnford, 1974; Levine & Banich, 1982; McKeever & Jackson, 1979; Wyke & Ettlinger, 
1961; Young, Bion, & Ellis, 1980; but see Schumller & Goodman, 1980). 
Importantly, neuroimaging studies and neurological patient data corroborate the 
findings of visual half-field studies in suggesting enhanced right hemisphere involvement 
in face recognition. Neuroimaging studies have found that there is a region in the right 
fusiform gyms, known as the fusiform face area, that is active during face recognition 
and that the homologous location to this area in the left hemisphere is not active during 
3 
face recognition (e.g., McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997). Furthermore, although 
prosopagnosic patients often have bilateral lesions, lesions limited to the right ventral 
visual system can produce prosopagnosia (e.g., Damasio, 1990; De Renzi, Perani, 
Carlesimo, Silveri, & Fazio, 1994; Whiteley & Warrington, 1978). A number of 
performance dissociations have also been found between face recognition and most forms 
of basic-level object recognition, suggesting that these processes use different methods of 
representing shape. For example, inverting non-Jace objects makes them only slightly 
more difficult to recognize whereas inverting faces makes them dramatically more 
difficult to recognize (Carey & Diamond, 1977; Scapinello & Yarmey, 1970; Yin, 1969; 
see Valentine, 1988 for a review). Likewise, whereas viewing an object in photographic 
negative only slightly impairs recognition performance when compared to standard 
viewing, recognition performance for faces in photographic negative is severely disrupted 
relative to standard viewing (Bruce & Langton, 1994; Galper, 1970; Galper & Hochberg, 
1971; Phillips, 1972). 
The Face System: Not Just for Faces Anymore 
Although the evidence discussed above was initially interpreted as suggesting that 
faces are "special" such that a specialized recognition system had evolved solely for the 
purpose of recognizing faces, the evidence now suggests that faces are not as special as 
once thought. Specifically, it now appears that the neural subsystem that subserves face 
recognition is not used solely to recognize faces, but rather is also used to perform some 
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other types of recognition tasks. For example, Diamond and Carey ( 1986) have 
demonstrated that some dog experts show an inversion effect for recognizing dogs similar 
in magnitude to the face inversion effect. Furthermore, in addition to deficits in face 
recognition, prosopagnosics frequently have problems distinguishing different animals, 
cars, foods, flowers, and buildings (Bornstein, 1963; Cole & Perez-Cruet, 1964; 
Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982; Farah, Levinson, & Klein, 1995; Newcombe, 
1979; Pallis, 1955). Also, recent fMRI studies have shown that the brain region known 
as the fusiform face area that was previously thought to become fully activated only 
during face recognition is also activated by a number of non-face recognition tasks 
(Gauthier, Anderson, Tarr, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1997; Gauthier, Skudkarski, Gore & 
Anderson, 2000; Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). For example, 
Gauthier et al. (2000) have shown that when car and bird experts view cars and birds, the 
regions of the viewers' fusiform face area become activated. 
Current Hypotheses Regarding the Types of Recognition Tasks 
Mediated by the Face Recognition System 
Although a specialized recognition system does not appear to have evolved solely 
to recognize faces, the evidence still suggests that there are two neurologically distinct 
recognition systems. One neural subsystem appears to subserve face recognition as well 
as some other types of recognition tasks, and another subsystem appears to subserve most 
forms of basic-level object recognition. However, controversy remains as to what types 
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of recognition tasks, in addition to face recognition, are mediated by the subsystem that 
subserves face recognition. The purpose of the current investigation is to help resolve 
this controversy. It will be argued that a recent hypothesis, the coordinate relations 
hypothesis (Cooper & Brooks, under submission), can account for the types of tasks that 
neuroimaging studies and neurological patient data suggest are mediated by the neural 
subsystem that mediates face recognition. Then, the current alternative hypotheses to the 
coordinate relations hypothesis will be described. Finally, the results of two experiments 
are reported that test the coordinate relations hypothesis and the other current hypotheses 
about the types of recognition tasks that are mediated by the subsystem that subserves 
face recognition. 
The coordinate relations hypothesis. Cooper and Wojan (2000) provided 
empirical evidence that most forms of basic-level object recognition use categorical 
relations to specify the locations of visual primitives whereas face recognition uses 
coordinate relations to specify the locations of visual primitives. When using categorical 
relations (e.g., Biederman, 1987; Dickenson, Pentland, & Rosenfeld, 1993; Hummel & 
Biederman, 1992), the locations of visual primitives are specified relative to the other 
visual primitives in the representation using broad categorical descriptors such as 
"above", "below", and "side of." Notice that the precise metric locations of visual 
primitives are not specified when using categorical relations. In contrast, when using 
coordinate relations (e.g., Bulthoff & Edelman, 1992; Lowe, 1987; Poggio & Edelman, 
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1990; Ullman, 1989), the precise metric locations of the visual primitives are specified 
relative to some fixed reference point in the representation. See Figure 1 for an 
illustration of how these two different methods of coding spatial relations are used for 
specifying the locations of visual primitives. 
Categorical Relations 
(Object Recognition) 
Eye above and side-of 
the nose. 
Coordinate Relations 
(Face Recognition) 
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Figure 1. Illustration how the spatial position of the 
primitive corresponding to the eye of the dog might be 
coded using categorical relations (in the left dog) and co-
ordinate relations (in the right dog). 
Cooper and Wojan (2000) speculated that the neural subsystem that mediates face 
recognition will be used whenever the computational demands of a recognition task 
require precise metric information that is not represented in current theories of shape 
recognition that rely on categorical relations ( e.g., Biederman, 1987) but that is retained 
in representational schemes that rely on coordinate relations (e.g., Ullman, 1989). As an 
example of a recognition task that could not be performed using current categorical 
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relations theories but that could be performed usmg coordinate relations theories, 
consider the task of distinguishing a dog from a fox. Notice that the spatial relations of 
the eyes, nose, ears, trunk, legs, tails, or other visual primitives tend not differ 
categorically between dogs and foxes. Therefore, because dogs and foxes would tend to 
activate the same representation under theories that posit the use of categorical relations, 
such theories would fail to distinguish a dog from a fox. In contrast, a dog and a fox 
could be distinguished from one another using the subtle metric information that is 
retained in current coordinate theories of object recognition (e.g., Ullman, 1989). 
Therefore, according to the coordinate relations hypothesis, the neural subsystem that 
mediates face recognition would mediate the recognition task of distinguishing a dog 
from a fox. Cooper and Wojan (2000) further speculated that the subsystem that 
mediates most forms of basic-level object recognition is used for any recognition tasks 
that could be performed using current theories of shape recognition that rely on 
categorical relations (e.g., Biederman, 1987). 
The biological recognition hypothesis. Another hypothesis regarding the 
circumstances under which the system that subserves face recognition is used is that the 
face system is used to recognize biological stimuli (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; 
Chao, Haxby & Martin, 1999; Chao, Martin & Haxby, 1999; Perani, Cappa, Bettinardi, 
Bressi, Gorno-Tempini, Matarrese, & Fazio, 1995) whereas the second system is used to 
recognize non-biological stimuli. 
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N euroimaging studies have shown that there are brain regions that respond 
selectively to biological stimuli whereas there are other regions that respond selectively 
to non-biological stimuli (e.g., Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Chao, Martin, & Haxby, 
1999; Perani, et al., 1995). For example, a recent fMRI study found that the brain regions 
that respond selectively to biological stimuli (animals and faces) are clustered together in 
the lateral fusiform gyrus whereas the brain regions that respond selectively to non-
biological stimuli (houses and tools) are clustered together in the medial fusiform gyrus 
(Chao et al., 1999). 
Cases of visual agnosia also support the hypothesis that different brain regions 
mediate the recognition of biological and non-biological stimuli. Some neurological 
patients have lost the ability to recognize biological stimuli but show intact recognition of 
most non-biological objects (e.g., Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; McCarthy & Warrington, 
1988; Montanes, Goldblum, & Boller, 1995; Ratcliff & Newcombe, 1982; Riddoch & 
Humphreys, 1987; Silveri & Gainotti, 1988; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). In contrast, 
other patients show the opposite pattern of dysfunction with intact recognition of 
biological stimuli but impaired recognition of non-biological stimuli (Hillis & 
Caramazza, 1991; Sacchet & Humphreys, 1992; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987, 1994 ). 
Notice that the coordinate relations hypothesis can also account for why some 
recognition tasks involving biological stimuli might be mediated by the system that 
subserves face recognition. As will be further explained in the introduction to 
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Experiment 2, many animals (e.g., dogs and foxes) would activate exactly the same 
representation under current theories of shape recognition that use categorical relations 
(e.g., Hummel & Biederman, 1992). In contrast, these animals would activate different 
representations under theories of shape recognition that rely on coordinate relations ( e.g., 
Ullman, 1989). Therefore, many animals would be recognized more efficiently using a 
representational scheme that relies on coordinate relations. According to the coordinate 
relations hypothesis, however, it is not the fact that animals are biological stimuli per se 
that leads some of them to be recognized using the face recognition system, but rather, it 
is the computational demands of the recognition task. 
The expert recognition hypothesis. Another influential hypothesis is that the 
subsystem that subserves face recognition subserves recognition tasks at which the 
viewer is a perceptual expert (e.g., Bruyer & Crispeels, 1992; Diamond & Carey, 1986; 
Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski & Gore, 2000; Gauthier, 
Williams, Tarr & Tanaka, 1998). An example of an expert recognition task is a car 
expert who can discriminate between a 1984 and a 1985 Corvette. Face recognition, 
according to this hypothesis, is simply an example of a recognition task in which virtually 
all viewers are perceptual experts. 
One of the lines of evidence supporting the expert recognition hypothesis is that 
perceptual experts show a strong inversion effect for recognition of classes of objects in 
their fields of expertise that is similar in magnitude to the face inversion effect. For 
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example, it has been found that the costs for having dog experts recognize inverted dogs 
is as large as the recognition costs that adults show for recognizing inverted faces, or as 
stated by Diamond and Carey ( 1986), 
No, faces are not special. The recognition of at least one other class of 
stimuli (dogs) is as sensitive to orientation as is recognition of faces 
provided that the perceivers are as expert at representing dogs as are adults 
at representing faces. (p. 116) 
Further evidence for the expert recognition hypothesis has come from fMRI 
studies that have shown that perceptual expertise recruits cortical regions in the fusiform 
gyrus that were once thought to only be fully activated during face recognition. For 
example, Gauthier et al. (2000) used fMRI to show that when car and bird experts view 
cars and birds, regions of the viewers' fusiform face area become activated. Further, 
expertise with previously novel objects recruits regions of the fusiform face area 
(Gauthier et al., 2000). 
Notice that many recognition tasks that require perceptual expertise could not be 
performed using current theories of shape recognition that rely on categorical relations. 
For example, all of the dogs used as stimuli in Diamond and Carey's (1986) experiments 
on expert recognition would activate exactly the same representation under current 
theories of object recognition that rely on categorical relations (e.g., Biederman, 1987). 
In contrast, coordinate theories of shape recognition would be sensitive to the metric 
information that would be required to perform many expert recognition tasks. Therefore, 
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the coordinate relations hypothesis predicts that many expert recognition tasks would be 
performed using the neural subsystem that mediates face recognition. However, 
according to the coordinate relations hypothesis, it is not expertise, per se, that leads 
some expert recognition tasks to be mediated by the system that subserves face 
recognition, but instead it is the computational demands of performing the recognition 
tasks. 
The subordinate-level recognition hypothesis. Another position regarding the 
types of recognition tasks that are mediated by the neural subsystem that subserves face 
recognition is that the system mediates subordinate-level recognition tasks (e.g., 
Damasio, et al., 1982; Gauthier, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). Subordinate-level 
recognition tasks are tasks that require the viewer to make distinctions among different 
members of the same basic-level category (e.g., distinguishing different models of cars 
from one another). According to this hypothesis, face recognition is simply a specific 
example of a subordinate-level recognition task. There are a number of lines of evidence 
that appear to support the subordinate-level recognition hypothesis. For example, recent 
neuroimaging studies have shown that subordinate-level recognition tasks lead to higher 
levels of activation in the fusiform face area than do basic-level recognition tasks with the 
same stimuli (e.g., Gauthier, Anderson, Tarr, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1997). Furthermore, a 
recent series of visual half-field studies has shown that specific exemplar object 
recognition (which is a form of subordinate-level object recognition), like face 
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recognition and unlike most forms of basic-level object recognition, operates more 
efficiently in the right hemisphere (Marsolek, 1999). 
The subordinate-level recognition hypothesis is also consistent with the pattern of 
recognition deficits that are frequently observed with prosopagnosic patients. For 
example, Damasio ( 1990) pointed out that, "When face agnosics must recognize nonface 
entities as unique individuals, for example, their own pets, houses or cars, their failure is 
generally as marked as it is for unique faces." (p.96). Damasio (1990) further noted that, 
"As a rule, the breakdown of recognition is most marked at the subordinate levels and 
spares the supraordinate levels." (p. 97). 
Notice that many members of the same basic level category ( e.g., most members 
of the basic-level category "dog") would activate the same representation in current 
theories of object recognition that rely on categorical relations ( e.g., Biederman, 1987). 
However, a system that relies on coordinate relations would be sensitive to the metric 
differences among members of the same basic-level category, and thus a system that 
relies on coordinate relations could be used to distinguish most members of the same 
basic-level category. Therefore, the co-ordinate relations hypothesis predicts that many 
subordinate-level recognition tasks would be mediated by the face recognition system. 
The Purpose of the Current Experiments 
The purpose of the research reported in this paper is to test the coordinate 
relations hypothesis against the biological recognition, expert recognition, and 
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subordinate-level recognition hypotheses. The experiments tested whether a particular 
recognition task is subserved by the neural subsystem that mediates face recognition by 
testing whether there is a right hemisphere recognition advantage for the recognition task. 
As discussed earlier, visual half-field studies find a strong right hemisphere advantage for 
face recognition whereas no right hemisphere advantage is typically found during basic-
level object recognition. Therefore, if a recognition task is mediated by the neural 
subsystem that subserves face recognition, then there should be a right hemisphere 
advantage for performing that recognition task. In contrast, if a recognition task is 
mediated by the neural subsystem that mediates most forms of basic-level object 
recognition, then there should be no hemispheric advantage for performing the task. 
Experiment 1 tested whether it is the type of stimuli (as predicted by the 
biological recognition hypothesis) or the computational demands of the recognition task 
(as predicted by the coordinate relations hypothesis) that determines whether a 
recognition task is mediated by the neural subsystem that subserves face recognition. 
Experiment 2 tested the coordinate relations hypothesis against the expert recognition and 
subordinate-level recognition hypotheses by testing whether the neural subsystem that 
subserves face recognition is used to perform a task that requires the use of coordinate 
relations but that is neither a subordinate-level nor an expert recognition task. 
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EXPERIMENT 1: SUBORDINATE-LEVEL AND 
BASIC-LEVEL FACE RECOGNITION 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to perform a visual half-field study that tested 
the biological recognition hypothesis against the coordinate relations hypothesis. 
Subjects in the experiment completed two blocks of trials in which they recognized 
stimuli presented to the left and right of foveal vision (i.e., the stimuli were presented 
initially to the right or left hemispheres of the brain). During one block of trials, subjects 
performed a subordinate-level face recognition task in which they were presented with 
famous faces; their task for each trial was to decide if the face presented on a computer 
screen belonged to a famous actor or not1• In order to perform the actor/non-actor task, 
the visual system must first be used to identify the individual depicted on the computer 
screen. Therefore, because the interest here is in the perceptual demands of the 
recognition task, the actor/non-actor task minimizes semantic requirements while still 
requiring subjects to visually recognize the faces at the subordinate-level. During the 
other block of trials, subjects performed a basic-level face recognition task in which half 
of the stimuli the subjects saw were human faces and the other half were either animal 
1 The reason for using the actor/non-actor task instead of a task requiring the subjects to explicitly name the 
faces is twofold. First, previous research has demonstrated that subjects find naming faces to be an 
extremely difficult task (Cohen, 1990; Cohen & Faulkner, 1986; Young, Hay, & Ellis, 1985) and previous 
pilot research in our lab indicated that performance on such tasks is highly variable and error prone. 
Therefore, the actor/non-actor task produces cleaner data. The second reason for choosing the actor/non-
actor decision task is because previous research on hemispheric specialization during face recognition has 
demonstrated that the right-hemisphere recognition advantage is only found when the semantic 
requirements of the recognition task do not exceed the perceptual requirements (for a review see Rhodes, 
1985). 
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faces (e.g., dog face) or other non-face objects (e.g., a couch); their task for each trial was 
to decide whether the stimulus presented on the screen was a human face. For both tasks, 
the decision was indicated via a button press. 
The reason that half of the non-human-face stimuli used in the basic-level face 
recognition block were non-biological objects (e.g., couch) was to provide a further test 
of the biological stimuli hypothesis if the results of the experiment showed that there is a 
right hemisphere advantage for basic-level face recognition. Specifically, if the 
biological stimuli hypothesis is correct, then there should not be a right hemisphere 
advantage for recognizing non-biological objects under the same conditions in which 
there is a right hemisphere advantage for recognizing biological objects. Therefore, the 
non-biological objects were included in the experiment so it would be possible to test for 
hemispheric specialization with non-biological objects if the results of the experiment 
showed a right hemisphere advantage for basic-level face recognition. 
The critical question in Experiment 1 was whether there would be a right 
hemisphere advantage only during subordinate-level face recognition or whether there 
would be a right hemisphere advantage for both subordinate-level and basic-level face 
recognition. Recall that the coordinate relations hypothesis posits that it is not the type of 
.. 
stimulus that is being recognized that determines whether a given recognition task is 
mediated by the face recognition system, but instead it is whether the task requires the 
use of coordinate relations. Cooper and Wojan (2000) demonstrated that the 
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representation that mediates subordinate-level face recognition uses coordinate relations 
to specify the spatial locations of visual primitives whereas the representation that 
mediates basic-level face recognition uses categorical relations. Therefore, the 
coordinate relations hypothesis predicts a right hemisphere advantage only during 
subordinate-level face recognition. In contrast, recall that the biological recognition 
hypothesis posits that it is the type of stimulus that is being recognized that determines 
whether the recognition task will use the neural subsystem that mediates face recognition 
(i.e., the face recognition system mediates the recognition of biological stimuli) . 
Because faces are biological stimuli, and because they must be distinguished from other 
biological stimuli in both blocks of trials, the biological recognition hypothesis predicts 
that there should be a right hemisphere advantage during both the subordinate and the 
basic-level face recognition tasks. 
Method 
Subjects. The subjects were 32 right-handed male2 undergraduate students with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision in the subject pool at Iowa State University. Hand 
2 Most experiments that are designed to investigate hemispheric specialization utilize only right-handed 
male subjects (unless, of course, the experiments are investigating the relation between sex or handedness 
and cerebral lateralization). The reason for using only right-handed males and excluding females and left-
handed males from participation is because there is a relation between sex, handedness, and cerebral 
lateralization. That is, brains of right-handed males tend to be the most lateralized whereas the brains of 
left-handed males and females are more likely than the brains of right-handed males to be functionally 
symmetrical or even show a reversed pattern of lateralization. Therefore, it is easier to find hemispheric 
asymmetries when using right-handed male subjects. For an extensive discussion about the relation 
between sex, handedness, and cerebral lateralization, see Springer and Deutsch (1997). 
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preference was determined by use of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 
1973). 
Apparatus. The experiment was controlled by a Power Macintosh G3 all-in-one 
computer using SuperLab Pro software. Subjects responded using a Cedrus RB-600 
response box that, in conjunction with SuperLab Pro, gives ±0.5 ms response time 
accuracy. Stimuli were presented on an Apple 15-inch color monitor with a resolution of 
832 X 624 pixels and a vertical refresh rate of 75 Hz. 
Stimuli for the experiment consisted of 56 pictures of famous people's faces (28 
actors and 28 non-actors), 28 pictures of animal faces (e.g., dog's face) , and 28 other 
objects (e.g., couch). All of the stimuli were scanned from color photographs at a 
resolution of 72 dots per inch, and all of the photographs of the faces were frontal view 
photographs. The stimuli for both blocks of trials were scaled such that their maximum 
extent just fit inside a 227 X 227 pixel box. Given the conditions of the experiment, the 
stimuli fit just inside a box that subtended 4° X 4° of visual angle. 
Procedure. Subjects completed two blocks of trials (i.e., a subordinate-level face 
recognition block and a basic-level face recognition block). Half of the subjects 
completed the subordinate-level block first and the other half completed the basic-level 
block first. 
During both blocks of trials, the presentation of the stimuli was self-paced. 
Subjects pushed a button to begin each trial. After pushing the button, a fixation cue was 
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presented for 1000 ms, followed by one of the stimuli positioned to the left or right of 
where the cue was presented for 148 ms ( 148 ms is too brief to make a second eye 
fixation). The closest edge of the image was presented 2.4° of visual angle to the left or 
right of where the cue was presented. During both blocks of trials, subjects used their 
right index finger to press the right button on the response box and their left index finger 
to press the left button on the response box. 
Subordinate-level face recognition block. Subjects were instructed that their task 
for each trial of the subordinate-level face recognition block was to press the button on 
the response box labeled "Actor" if the face presented on the screen belonged to an actor 
and to press the button on the response box labeled "Non Actor" if the face presented on 
the screen belonged to a non-actor. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly as 
possible while striving for 90% accuracy. For half of the subjects, the right button was 
labeled "Actor" and the left button was labeled "Non-Actor" and for the other half of the 
subjects, the right button was labeled "Non-Actor" and the left button was labeled 
"Actor". 
There were 56 experimental trials during the subordinate-level block and each 
face was only presented once during the block. Specifically, 14 actors and 14 non-actors 
were presented to the left of fixation, and 14 actors and 14 non-actors were presented to 
the right of fixation. Stimulus presentation was balanced such that across a set of two 
subjects, each face was presented to the left and right of fixation once and only once, thus 
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each stimulus was presented equally often to the left and right of fixation across the 32 
subjects. Each subject viewed the stimuli in a different, random order. 
Basic-level face recognition block. Prior to the beginning of the basic-level face 
recognition block, each subject was instructed that his task for each trial was to press the 
button labeled "Non human-face" if the stimulus presented on the screen was not a 
human face and to press the button labeled "Human Face" if the stimulus was a human 
face. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly as possible while striving for 90% 
accuracy. For half of the subjects, the right button was labeled "Non human-face" and 
the left button was labeled "Human face" and for the other half of the subjects, the labels 
were reversed. 
Each subject was presented with 112 experimental trials in the basic-level block 
and each stimulus was only presented once during the block of trials. Specifically, 28 
non human-faces and 28 human faces were presented to the left of fixation and 28 human 
faces and 28 non human-faces were presented to the right of fixation. Stimulus 
presentation was balanced such that across a set of two subjects, each stimulus was 
presented to the left and right of fixation once and only once, thus each stimulus was 
presented equally often to the left and right of fixation across the 42 subjects. Each 
subject was presented with the stimuli in a different, random order. 
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Subjects were presented with eight practice trials prior to the beginning of each 
block using the same presentation conditions that were used during the actual experiment 
blocks. The stimuli used during the practice trials were not used during the actual 
experiment. 
Results 
Only the data from the trials in which the stimuli were human faces were analyzed 
(i.e., the trials in which the stimuli were animal faces or other non human-face objects 
were excluded from the analysis). The response time data from Experiment 1 are shown 
in Figure 1. Response times and error rates were subjected to a within subjects analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) with level of categorization (subordinate-level vs. basic-level) and 
hemisphere (right vs. left) as the variables in the analysis. 
Response Time Data. There was a reliable main effect of level of categorization 
E(l, 31)=275.72, n<.0001, MSE = 24553.26. Overall, subjects were faster at performing 
basic-level face recognition (mean RT= 497 ms) than at performing the subordinate-level 
face recognition task (mean RT= 957 ms). There was no main effect of hemisphere E(l, 
31)=1.123, _p<.29, MSE = 2008.23. There was a reliable interaction of level of 
categorization and hemisphere, E(l, 31)=4.95, n<.035, MSE = 1049.02. Planned 
contrasts revealed a reliable L VF/RH advantage for performing subordinate-level face 
recognition E(l, 31)=6.2 n<.014, MSE = 1049.02 whereas no hemispheric effects were 
found for basic-level face recognition E(l, 31)=0.291, n>.59, MSE = 1050.6. 
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Figure 2. Response time data from Experiment 1. Error 
bars represent the standard error of the mean (See Loftus 
and Loftus, 1988). 
Error Data. The error data from the experiment are shown in Table 1. Error data 
showed a reliable main effect for level of categorization, E(l, 31 )= 199 .54 7, p<.0001, 
MSE = .004. Subjects made more errors when performing the subordinate-level face 
recognition task (mean = 19%) than when performing the basic-level face recognition 
task (mean= 3%). Neither the hemisphere main effect, E(l, 31)=0.16, n>.74, MSE = 
.004 nor the Level of Categorization x Hemisphere interaction, E(l, 31)=0.61, n>.43, 
MSE = .003 approached statistical reliability. 
Table 1 
Error data from Experiment 1 
Subordinate-Level 
Hemisphere 
Right 
Left 
M 
18.5% 
19.6% 
SE 
1.5 
1.3 
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Discussion 
Basic-Level 
M 
3.2% 
2.8% 
SE 
0.7 
0.8 
The results of Experiment 1 showed a right hemisphere advantage for 
subordinate-level face recognition whereas there was no right hemisphere advantage for 
performing the basic-level face recognition task. The biological stimuli hypothesis 
predicts a right hemisphere advantage for both subordinate and basic-level face 
recognition whereas the coordinate relations hypothesis predicts a right hemisphere 
advantage for only subordinate-level face recognition. Therefore, the results of 
Experiment 1 are incongruent with the biological stimuli hypothesis and congruent with 
the coordinate relations hypothesis. 
23 
EXPERIMENT 2: BASIC-LEVEL AND SUPERORDINATE -LEVEL 
ANIMAL RECOGNITION 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to perform a visual half-field study that tested 
the coordinate relations hypothesis against the expert recognition and subordinate-level 
recognition hypotheses. Subjects in Experiment 2 completed two blocks of trials in 
which they recognized stimuli presented to the left and right of foveal vision (i.e., the 
stimuli were presented initially to the left or right hemispheres of the brain). During the 
basic-level animal recognition block, subjects were presented with photographs of 
animals on a computer screen, and their task for each trial was to decide if the animal 
presented on a computer screen was a domesticated animal or a wild animal3• Notice that 
in order to decide whether a stimulus is a domesticated animal or a wild animal, a viewer 
must first access the basic-level identity of the animal (i.e., they must first decide if the 
stimulus is a fox, dog, cow, deer, etc.). During the superordinate-level animal 
recognition block of trials, subjects were presented with animals and non-animal objects, 
and their task for each trial was to decide if the stimulus presented on the screen was an 
animal or a non-animal object. 
The coordinate relations, expert recognition, and subordinate-level recognition 
hypotheses make different predictions about which of the recognition tasks in Experiment 
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2 should be mediated by the recognition system that subserves face recognition, and 
therefore, the hypotheses make different predictions about which tasks will show a right 
hemisphere recognition advantage. None of the recognition tasks in Experiment 2 are 
expert recognition or subordinate-level tasks, and therefore, the expert recognition and 
the subordinate-level recognition hypothesis predicts that none of the recognition tasks in 
Experiment 2 will show a right hemisphere recognition advantage. In contrast, many 
different animal species would activate exactly the same representation in theories of 
shape recognition that rely on categorical relations ( e.g., Biederman, 1987). For example, 
the spatial locations of the primitives corresponding to the eyes, nose, ears, trunk, legs, 
and tails do not differ categorically between animals such as cats, dogs, coyotes, and 
foxes. In fact, one of the common criticisms of current categorical theories of shape 
recognition is that they lack the representational power to distinguish many animals from 
one another whereas current coordinate theories would be able to represent the metric 
information that could be used to recognize animals (Tarr & Bulthoff, 1995). Therefore, 
the coordinate relations hypothesis predicts that animals that would not activate unique 
representations under current categorical theories of shape recognition will be recognized 
3 Pilot research showed that subjects have a difficult time generating the name of many animals that they 
nonetheless visually recognized at the basic-level. Therefore, the wild/domesticated task was used instead 
of a naming task because the wild/domesticated task requires viewers to recognize the animals at the basic-
level but eliminates the semantic requirements of having to access the name of the animal from memory. 
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using the neural subsystem that subserves face recognition, and thus, there should be a 
right hemisphere advantage for basic-level animal recognition. 
If there is a right hemisphere advantage for basic-level animal recognition, then 
the superordinate-level animal recognition block is needed to test an alternative 
explanation to the coordinate relations hypothesis for why there is a right hemisphere 
advantage for basic-level animal recognition. It has been suggested that the reason 
different neural substrates mediate the recognition of stimuli from different categories is 
that the different neural substrates are tuned to process different object features that 
members of a category share (Chao et al., 1999). Therefore, a right hemisphere 
advantage for basic-level animal recognition might reflect the fact that neural substrates 
located in the right hemisphere are better tuned to animal features instead of reflecting the 
fact that coordinate relations are required to perform the recognition task. If this 
alternative account is correct, then there should be a right hemisphere advantage for 
superordinate-level animal recognition because the features that correspond to animals 
must be extracted during superordinate-level animal recognition. In contrast, if the 
coordinate-relations hypothesis is correct, then there should only be a right hemisphere 
advantage for basic-level animal recognition because superordinate-level animal 
recognition does not require the use of coordinate relations (i.e., animals can be 
distinguished from non-animals using representational schemes that posit categorical 
relations). 
26 
Method 
The method for Experiment 2 was identical to the method for Experiment 1 in all 
but two respects. First, 112 stimulus items consisting of 28 domesticated animals, 28 
non-domesticated animals, and 56 other non-animal objects (e.g., couch) were used in 
Experiment 2. Second, instead of completing a subordinate-level face recognition bock 
of trials, subjects performed a basic-level animal recognition block of trials, and instead 
of completing a basic-level face recognition block of trials, subjects completed a 
superordinate-level animal recognition block of trials. During the basic-level block of 
trials, subjects were presented with domesticated animals and wild animals and their task 
for each trial was to press the button labeled "Domesticated" if the animal was 
domesticated and to press the button labeled "Wild" if the animal was a wild animal. All 
of the animals were either four-legged mammals or birds. During the superordinate-level 
animal recognition block of trials, subjects were presented with animals and non-animal 
objects, and their task for each trial was to press the button labeled "Animal" if the 
stimulus was an animal and to press the button labeled "Non-Animal" if the stimulus was 
not an animal. 
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Results 
Only the data from the trials in which the stimuli were c1nirp_als were analyzed. 
The mean response times from Experiment 2 are shown in Figure 3. Response times and 
error rates were subjected to a within subjects ANOVA with level of categorization 
(basic-level vs. superordinate-level) and hemisphere (right vs. left) as the variables in the 
analysis. 
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Figure 3. Response time data from Experiment 2. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
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Response Time Data. There was a reliable main effect of level of categorization, 
E(l, 39)= 177.359, n< .0001, MSE = 26673.43. Overall, subjects were faster at 
performing the superordinate-level animal recognition task than the basic-level animal 
recognition task. There was also a reliable main effect of hemisphere, E(l, 39)= 4.785, n 
> .03, MSE = 3103.67. The interaction between level of categorization and hemisphere 
approached statistical reliability, E(l, 39)= 3.009, n< .09, MSE = 4159.47. Planned 
contrasts (the use of planned contrasts will be justified in the next paragraph) revealed a 
reliable LVF/RH advantage for performing the basic-level animal recognition task, E(l, 
39)= 6.568, n<.0145, MSE = 4159.27 whereas no hemispheric effects were found for the 
superordinate-level animal recognition block, E(l, 39)= .012, n>.9135, MSE = 4147.17. 
For both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the coordinate relations hypothesis 
predicted an interaction between level of categorization and hemisphere such that there is 
a right hemisphere advantage for the more subordinate-level recognition task and no right 
hemisphere advantage for the more superordinate-level recognition task. The interaction 
between level of categorization and hemisphere was statistically reliable in Experiment 1 
but only marginally reliable in Experiment 2. Therefore, in order to test whether that the 
interaction between level of categorization and hemisphere was similar in both 
experiments (as predicted by the coordinate relations hypothesis), a 3-way ANOVA was 
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conducted with level of categorization4 (more subordinate vs. more superordinate) and 
hemisphere (right vs. left) and experiment (Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2) as factors in 
the analysis. There was a reliable interaction between level of categorization and 
hemisphere E(l, 70)= 5.42, n< .02, MSE = 2522.06 but there was no Experiment X Level 
of Categorization X Hemisphere interaction, .E(l, 70)= 0.12, n> .72, MSE = 90793.35. 
Therefore, as predicted by the coordinate relations hypothesis, the two-way interaction 
between level of categorization and hemisphere is similar in both experiments. This 
finding, coupled with the finding that the interaction between level of categorization and 
hemisphere was marginally significant in Experiment 2 suggests that a lack of statistical 
power in Experiment 2 was responsible for the interaction between level of categorization 
and hemisphere falling just short of statistical reliability. Therefore, in order to protect 
against a type II error, planned contrasts (as reported in the previous paragraph) were 
conduced on the data from Experiment 2. 
Error data. The error data from Experiment 2 can been seen in Table 2. Error 
data showed a reliable main effect for level of categorization, .E(l, 39)= 59.167, n<.0001, 
MSE = .018. Subjects made more errors when performing the basic-level animal 
recognition task (mean = 23%) than when performing the superordinate-level animal 
4 By subordinate, I simply mean subordinate relative to the more superordinate-level recognition task 
within an experiment. For example, in Experiment 2, the more subordinate-level recognition task is the 
basic-level animal recognition task and the more superordinate-level recognition task is the superordinate-
level animal recognition task. 
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recognition task (mean = 7% ). Neither the hemisphere main effect, _E(l, 39)=2.315, 
n>.13, MSE = .006 nor the Level of Categorization x Hemisphere interaction, _E(l, 
39)=2.349, ,12>.1335, MSE = .008 were statistically reliable, although trends in the error 
data were in the same direction as in the response time data. 
Table 2 
Error data from Experiment 2 
Basic-Level 
Hemisphere 
Right 
Left 
M 
21.2% 
25.2% 
SE 
2.2 
1.9 
Discussion 
Superordinate-Level 
M SE 
7.1% 
6.8% 
1.3 
1.5 
The results of Experiment 2 showed a right hemisphere advantage for basic-level 
animal recognition whereas there was no advantage of one hemisphere over the other for 
superordinate-level animal recognition. The expert recognition and subordinate-level 
recognition hypotheses predict no hemispheric specialization for either basic or 
superordinate-level animal recognition. In contrast, the coordinate-relations hypothesis 
predicts a right hemisphere advantage for basic-level animal recognition. Therefore, the 
results of Experiment 2 are incongruent with the expert recognition and the subordinate-
level recognition hypotheses and congruent with the coordinate relations hypothesis. 
The finding that there is not a right hemisphere advantage for superordinate-level 
animal recognition demonstrates that the right hemisphere advantage for basic-level 
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animal recognition is not due to a right hemisphere superiority at extracting the visual 
features that correspond to animals. Instead, as predicted by the coordinate relations 
hypothesis, the right hemisphere advantage for basic-level animal recognition must be 
due to the computational demands placed on the visual system for recognizing animals at 
the basic-level. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This paper reported the results of two experiments that were designed to 
investigate the types of recognition tasks that are mediated by the recognition system that 
subserves face recognition. Due to the fact that the recognition system that mediates face 
recognition operates either exclusively or more efficiently in the right cerebral 
hemisphere, the current experiments used a right hemisphere recognition advantage as a 
marker to indicate whether various recognition tasks are mediated using the system that 
subserves face recognition. If a recognition task is mediated using the neural subsystem 
that subserves face recognition, then the recognition task should show a right hemisphere 
recognition advantage. In contrast, the lack of a right hemisphere recognition advantage 
for a recognition task indicates that the task is not mediated using the system that 
subserves face recognition. 
The Introduction to this paper discussed four current hypotheses regarding the 
types of recognition tasks that are mediated by the neural subsystem that subserves face 
recognition. The current set of experiments was designed to test which of these 
hypotheses offers the best account for the types of recognition tasks that are mediated by 
face subsystem. Experiment 1 demonstrated that there is a right hemisphere advantage 
for subordinate but not basic-level face recognition. Therefore, the results of Experiment 
1 are incongruent with the biological stimuli hypothesis but congruent with the 
coordinate relations hypothesis. 
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The results of Experiment 1 suggest that the biological stimuli hypothesis is not a 
plausible hypothesis regarding the types of recognition tasks that are mediated by the 
system that subserves face recognition. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to pit the 
coordinate relations hypothesis against the other two remaining hypotheses (i.e., the 
expert recognition and the subordinate-level recognition hypotheses) about the types of 
visual recognition tasks that are mediated by the neural system that subserves face 
recognition. The results of Experiment 2 showed that there is a right hemisphere 
advantage for basic-level animal recognition but that there is not a right hemisphere 
advantage for superordinate-level animal recognition. Therefore, the results of 
Experiment 2 are incongruent with the expert recognition and the subordinate-level 
recognition hypotheses. However, the results of Experiment 2 are congruent with the 
coordinate relations hypothesis. 
Notice that across both experiments, the tasks that showed a right hemisphere 
recognition advantage were also the tasks that error rates and response time data suggest 
were the more difficult recognition tasks whereas the easier recognition tasks did not 
show any hemispheric specialization. Could it be the case that task difficulty ( as opposed 
to the use of a coordinate representation) is the critical variable that explains the pattern 
of hemispheric specialization observed across the two experiments? That is, maybe 
more difficult visual recognition tasks are mediated in the right cerebral hemisphere 
whereas less taxing tasks can be mediated equally well in both hemispheres of the brain. 
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However, there are a number of reasons to reject task difficulty as an explanation for the 
pattern of hemispheric asymmetries observed across the two experiments. 
First, it is not the case that more difficult tasks always show a right hemisphere 
recognition advantage. For example, although there is a large right hemisphere 
advantage for recognizing upright faces, there is not a right hemisphere advantage for 
recognizing inverted faces (e.g., Leehey, Carey, Diamond, & Cahn, 1978). It is well 
established that recognizing inverted faces is a much more difficult task than recognizing 
upright faces (see Valentine, 1988 for a review). Therefore, if the difficulty of a 
recognition task is the critical variable that determines whether the task will show a right 
hemisphere recognition advantage, then there should be a right hemisphere advantage for 
recognizing both upright and inverted faces. Second, Cooper and Brooks (under 
submission) have shown that there is not a right hemisphere advantage for recognizing 
produce (i.e., fruits and vegetables) even though produce recognition was as difficult as 
animal recognition. Third, hemispheric effects have been found for tasks that are 
extremely easy to perform. For example, Kosslyn et al, (1989) has found hemispheric 
effects for extremely easy tasks such as deciding whether a dot is above or below a line. 
Therefore, it is not the case that easy recognition tasks are all mediated equally well in 
both hemispheres of the brain. 
Fourth, the coordinate relations hypothesis offers an explanation for why the tasks 
in the current experiments that showed a right hemisphere advantage are more difficult 
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than the tasks that did not show a right hemisphere advantage. Specifically, coordinate 
theories of shape recognition ( e.g., Ullman, 1989) posit the use of time-consuming and 
computationally difficult normalization procedures that are used to bring an input 
representation into some standardized size or orientation before recognition can take 
place. In contrast, theories of shape recognition that rely on categorical relations ( e.g., 
Biederman, 1987) do not posit any time-consuming normalization procedure. Therefore, 
the coordinate relations hypothesis predicts that recognition tasks that are mediated using 
a coordinate representation would also be tasks that would be more difficult to perform 
than tasks that could be performed using categorical relations. 
In summary, the coordinate relations hypothesis is the only current hypothesis in 
the literature that can account for the patterns of hemispheric asymmetries found in the 
current set of experiments. Therefore, the current set of experiments provide evidence 
that the neural subsystem that mediates face recognition is best conceptualized as a 
recognition system that is used whenever the demands of a recognition task require the 
use of coordinate relations to specify the locations of visual primitives. 
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COORDINATE RELATIONS AND CATEGORY-SPECIFIC BRAIN REGIONS 
One of the most exciting discoveries in the cognitive neuroscience of vision over 
the last few years is the finding that there are distinct cortical representations for objects 
from different semantic categories. For example, recent fMRI experiments have 
demonstrated that faces, houses, chairs, tools, and animals all activate different regions of 
the ventral visual system (Ashai, Ungerleider, Martin & Haxby, 2000; Chao et al., 1999; 
Kanwisher, Stanley, & Harris, 1999). These findings suggest that the brain regions 
involved with the visual recognition of objects are organized as a mosaic of category-
specific modules laid out on the surface of the cortex. 
Currently, there is a large amount of research being performed to investigate the 
spatial arraignment of the modules in the mosaic (e.g., see Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, 
Schouten & Haxby, 2000). For example, it has been found that within the medial region 
of the fusiform gyms there is a region that responds strongly to tools and houses and that 
within the more lateral regions of the fusiform gyms, there are regions that responded 
more strongly to faces and animals (Chao et al., 1999). Furthermore, within the medial 
and lateral regions, finer grained distinctions were found regarding the neural substrates 
that are responsive to objects from different categories. Within the medial regions of the 
fusiform gyms tools and houses activated distinct but slightly overlapping regions of 
. cortex and that within .the lateral -regions that faces and animals activated distinct but -
overlapping regions of cortex (Chao et al., 1999). 
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Chao, Haxby, and Martin (1999) suggested that the organization of the ventral 
visual system might be determined by object features that cluster together in the cortex, 
and note that the nature of these features remains to be determined. However, notice that 
the coordinate relations hypothesis offers a natural account for why the regions that 
respond to houses and tools are clustered together and why the regions that respond to 
faces and animals are clustered together. Face and animal recognition are both tasks that 
rely on coordinate relations, and thus faces and animals would be expected to activate 
similar anatomical regions. In contrast, recognizing houses and tools can be performed 
using categorical relations, and thus houses and tools would be expected to activate 
similar anatomical regions. Therefore, it might be the case that the modules in the ventral 
visual system are anatomically organized according to whether the stimuli represented 
within the modules tend to be recognized using a representation that relies on coordinate 
relations. Specifically, maybe the lateral regions of the fusiform gyms are used for 
representing objects that tend to be recognized using coordinate relations whereas the 
medial regions of the fusiform gyms are used for representing objects that tend to be 
recognized using categorical relations. 
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